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Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision that broadens the scope of the Internet by incor-
porating physical objects to identify themselves to the participating entities. This inno-
vative concept enables a physical object to represent itself in the digital world. There
have been a lot of speculations and future forecasts about these physical objects con-
nected with the Internet, however, most of them lack secure features and are vulnerable
to a wide range of attacks. Miniature sensor nodes, embedded in these physical ob-
jects, limit the support for computationally complex and resource-consuming secured
algorithms. In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutual authentication scheme for
the real-world physical objects of an IoT environment. It is a payload-based encryption
scheme which uses a simple four-way handshake mechanism to verify the identities of
the participating objects. The real-world objects communicate with each other using
the client-server interaction model. Our proposed scheme uses the lightweight features
of Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) to enable the clients to observe resources
residing on the server, in an energy-efficient manner. We use Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), with a key length of 128 bits, to establish a secured session for re-
source observation. We evaluate our scheme for a real-world scenario using NetDuino
Plus 2 boards. Our scheme is computationally efficient, incurs less connection over-
head and at the same time, provides a robust defence against various attacks such as,
resource exhaustion, Denial-of-Service, replay and physical tampering.
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1. Introduction
Technological advances in the field of wireless, cellular and sensor networks have
laid a solid foundation for the IoT. It is a novel paradigm which encompasses the ev-
eryday physical world objects by enabling them to interact with each other using the
unique addressing schemes [1]. It is estimated that around 50 billion such objects will
be connected to the Internet by 20201. These objects will be empowered to sense,
process and control the physical world events and numerous phenomena of interest.
This integration and interoperable communication will generate an enormous amount
of data which needs to be stored, processed, analysed and transmitted in a very system-
atic manner [2]. Eventually, the IoT will lead us to the Internet of Everything (IoE),
where the objects, data and processes will be integral parts of our daily lives. We are
moving to an era where the Internet of embedded objects will become ubiquitous by
integrating the virtual world of information with the physical world of objects.
The integration of physical objects with the Internet requires various communi-
cation models. This requirement will likely add some very ingenious and innovative
malicious models to the future Internet [3]. Security provisioning in an IoT framework
is a challenging task because each physical object has its own distinguishing features.
The identity of each person, object and system connected with the Internet needs to be
verified. In the absence of the identity verification, the intruders will gain access to the
network and perform various malicious activities. The consequences of these activities
are diverse in nature with applications ranging from disabling a home security system,
conveying false health readings to practitioners to activating false fire alarms.
Despite all these threats, most of the currently available IoT products in the market
lack secured features. Thus, we are about to use products which are vulnerable to a
wide range of security breaches. Rather than improving our lives, these products will
1http://www.cisco.com/web/solutions/trends/iot/indepth.html
2
lead us to a new era of cybercrimes. As a result, the IoT will more likely become the
Internet of Vulnerabilities (IoV). Recently, Proofpoint Inc.2, a leading security firm un-
covered a cyber-attack involving physical objects. This is considered as the first major
security breach in the world of IoT. Over a period of less than two weeks, 750, 000 ma-
licious emails were transmitted from more than 100, 000 devices. Interestingly, more
than 25 percent of those devices were real-world objects including televisions, refrig-
erators and other household appliances. It was so far the simplest attack regarded as
misconfiguration and using default passwords were sufficient to conduct such attack.
Hence, the IoT is exposed to various security threats which include the botnets along
with the thingnets.
In view of the above discussion, we propose a lightweight mutual authentication
scheme through payload encryption in this paper. The Constrained Application Pro-
tocol (CoAP) [4] is used as the underlying protocol to meet the requirements of the
resource-starving objects. The major contributions of our research are as follows.
1. Our proposed scheme verifies the identities of clients and the server communicat-
ing with each other. It is a payload-based mutual authentication scheme which
incurs a small connection overhead and is computationally simple and robust.
A lightweight handshake mechanism consisting of only two round-trip message
exchanges is used for the client and server authentication. Both the client and
server challenge each other for authentication by generating encrypted payloads.
The payload of each message is kept to a maximum of 256 bits.
2. Our proposed scheme uses the lightweight features of CoAP only for the ex-
change of resources among the clients and server. These lightweight features in-
clude asynchronous message exchange, small-sized CoAP header, simpler caching
mechanism and parsing complexity. CoAP alone does not provide security fea-
tures but relies on Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [5] at the trans-
port layer for security provisioning. However, DTLS is computationally com-
plex and requires ample of network resources which is not the case with most of
the resource-starving physical objects of an IoT. Our proposed scheme replaces
2http://www.proofpoint.com/about-us/press-releases/01162014.php
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DTLS and incorporates all the features necessary for securing the physical ob-
jects. Unlike DTLS, our scheme does not introduce a separate protocol layer
which further reduces the computation and communication cost. Our scheme
can be a lightweight yet robust and secure alternative to the DTLS for the IoT
objects, a claim validated by our experimental results.
3. Malicious nodes are restricted from establishing multiple connections with the
server at a given time which eliminates the possibility of resource exhaustion and
DoS attacks. Each client is allowed to establish only a single connection with
the server in order to fairly utilize its limited resources. Our scheme ensures that
the resources are provided only to the legitimate clients by a legitimate server.
4. Our proposed scheme is resilient not only to resource exhaustion and DoS attacks
but also to the replay attack. Freshness of the notification updates from the server
is used as a measure to detect a replay attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, related work from
the literature is provided. In Section III, we first present an overview of the problem
statement followed by our proposed lightweight payload-based mutual authentication
scheme. The design decisions and objectives of our proposed scheme are also ex-
plained in this section. In Section IV, the resilience of the proposed scheme is analyzed
against various attacks during mutual authentication and data exchange. In Section V,
we provide the experimental results for our proposed scheme. Finally, the paper is
concluded and the future research directions are provided in Section VI.
2. Related Work
In this section, we provide related research securing IoT objects and various au-
thentication schemes to better manage communications between these objects. First,
an overview of the CoAP protocol is presented followed by a brief description of var-
ious authentication and cryptographic schemes to meet the ever-existing security and
privacy challenges in the IoT.
The HTTP-based web technology uses the Representational State Transfer (REST)
architecture [6]. This protocol requires extensive memory and computational capabili-
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ties for resource provisioning. The objects in an IoT environment are mostly resource-
constrained so their capabilities are restricted to support the HTTP-based web services.
Hence, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)3 has formed a special working
group known as Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE). This working group is
responsible for developing lightweight protocols to provide web resources for IoT [7].
The CoAP protocol is one such product of this working group which inherits a subset
of the HTTP features to meet the requirements of a resource-constrained IoT [4].
CoAP uses a simple request/response interaction model for exchanging the re-
sources among clients and servers. Each client has the option to register itself with
a particular server for the resource observation [8]. The registration request is a con-
firmable (CON) message having an observe option which is a 24-bit sequence number.
A CON request needs to be acknowledged (ACK) by the server with a matching re-
sponse. CoAP supports four types of messages: Confirmable (CON), Non-Confirmable
(NON), Acknowledgement (ACK) and Reset (RST). The protocol supports various
methods such as GET, POST, DELETE and PUT for resource manipulation. The CON
and NON messages may carry a request or response with one or more methods applied
to it. CoAP has a fixed length binary header of only 4 bytes, hence, fewer resources are
consumed. The cost-effective provisioning of RESTful services in Low-power Lossy
Networks (LLNs) coupled with low complexity in terms of protocol header, message
parsing, asynchronous transaction model and build-in resource discovery makes it an
ideal choice for the IoT deployment. As a result of these distinguishing features, CoAP
is an ideal replacement for the existing IoT protocols such as MQTT [9] and XMPP
[10]. Hence, CoAP is deployed in various applications such as transport logistics [11],
home automation system [12], smart cities [13] and freight supervision [14].
Like any other communication network, the information in an IoT environment is
susceptible to various types of attacks at different layers. In [15], the authors high-
lighted various security challenges faced by these networks. The error-prone commu-
nication links coupled with the resource-constrained nature of objects restrict the use of
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [16]. In addition, the packets may arrive out of order,
3https://www.ietf.org/
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and may be missing and/or corrupted. Hence, the DTLS is an obvious choice for se-
curing the communication in a CoAP-based IoT. The handshake and the record layers
of DTLS incur 25 bytes of overhead in each datagram header. IEEE.802.15.4 speci-
fies a physical layer Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) of only 127 bytes. Hence,
only 60-75 bytes are left for the payload after the addition of DTLS, Medium Access
Control (MAC) and upper layers headers [17].
DTLS needs to be profiled to make it more friendly toward the resource-constrained
networks [18]. Bhattacharyya et al. [19] proposed a lightweight authentication scheme
to establish a unicast communication channel. Their scheme is based on symmetric
encryption algorithm to reduce the energy and computation costs of sensor-embedded
physical objects. The authors claimed that DTLS can be configured to develop an
energy-efficient authentication scheme. However, they have not validated their claim.
Granjal et al. [20] studied the use of DTLS as the underlying protocol for securing the
communication in a CoAP-based IoT environment. The authors argued that the scarcity
of payload space may not suit applications having larger payloads. They suggested to
employ security at other layers such as compressed form of IPSec. Kothmayr et al.
[21] proposed a robust security scheme using the RSA algorithm. They have presented
their DTLS implementation in the context of system architecture to achieve high inter-
operability and low overhead. However, the computational overhead incurred by their
handshake mechanism consumes higher energy, primarily due to the use of RSA-based
complex cipher suites. In [22], the authors evaluated the performance of DTLS hand-
shaking for the resource-starving objects using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
The use of complex and resource-consuming cipher suites of an ECC algorithm result
in higher energy consumption. In [23], the authors have proposed the DTLS imple-
mentation for smart phones (INDIGO) using CoAP. INDIGO uses extensive resource-
consuming cryptographic cipher suites and its use is restricted only to smart phones.
In [24], the authors have proposed a lightweight authentication scheme for resource
observation in a CoAP-based IoT environment. The identities of the interacting clients
and server are validated before establishing an authentication session. The proposed
scheme lacks experimental results for determining the efficiency and accuracy of the
authentication algorithm.
6
Although, DTLS-based schemes support a wide range of cipher suites for security
provisioning, however, DTLS was originally designed for networks having abundant of
resources. The resource-consuming complex cipher suites of DTLS do not consider the
message length as a critical design criterion for securing a network. Therefore, using
DTLS for an IoT implementation is an expensive choice and may not be an optimal
solution for securing the network.
3. A Lightweight Payload-based Mutual Authentication Scheme
As discussed in Section 2, almost all of the CoAP-based implementations for IoT
rely on DTLS for the secure exchange of resources among the physical objects. How-
ever, the DTLS-enabled CoAP stack introduces an extra protocol layer for security
provisioning which increases the computational and communication cost. In our pro-
posed scheme, no extra protocol layer is added. The absence of an additional protocol
layer does not compromise the security of messages exchanged among the clients and
server. Authentication is provided at the time of request-response interaction among
the clients and server while the session key is exchanged within the payload of trans-
mitted messages. In Figure 1, a comparison of our proposed scheme is provided with
the existing DTLS-enabled CoAP stack.
In this section, we present our lightweight payload-based mutual authentication
scheme for validating the identities of real-world physical objects. First, the problem at
hand is identified which builds the foundation of our proposed authentication scheme.
3.1. Problem Statement
IoT incorporates physical objects which differ from each other in terms of various
resources and operational behaviours. The sensor nodes embedded in them provide
seamless and interoperable communication. These miniature sensors give a unique ID
to each participating object in the IoT paradigm. Any physical object is smart as long
as it can identify itself to the participating objects in the network. To make an object
smart enough, it requires an IP address and an embedded sensor node [25].
A small scale IoT communication model consisting of various physical objects is
shown in Figure 2. Here, the electric heater, the refrigerator and the rest of the objects
7
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Figure 1: DTLS-enabled CoAP Stack vs. Our Proposed Scheme
are the clients which communicate with a NetDuino4 server for the observation of
a temperature resource. The server monitors the temperature and provides it to the
clients. Each client may specify certain conditions for the notification of temperature
readings. The clients and server will not be able to communicate in the absence of an IP
address. The presence of an IP address enables an object to perform various RESTful
operations in a resource-constrained network.
The resource-constrained network of Figure 2 may be susceptible to a wide range
of malicious activities. The intruder may intercept the refrigerator data, manipulate it
and replay in other parts of the network. It is also possible that the attacker may inject
fabricated data of its own. Therefore, a huge amount of data is at risk which may result
in the malfunctioning of the whole network. Similar to a legitimate device, a malicious
object also requires an ID to participate in network communication. Each participating
object needs to be authenticated to establish its true identity in the network. In the
absence of ID validation and authentication, an attacker will always be able to conduct
a wide range of malicious activities. An intruder may establish multiple connections
4http://netduino.com/
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Figure 2: A Vulnerable Internet of Things Connected Environment
with a server at a given time so that multiple network resources will be seized by the
malicious object. This results in the denial of services to the legitimate objects and
ultimately causes scarcity of resources in the network [26]. As wireless medium is
shared among various objects, the intruder may block access to the network resources
by continuously emitting jamming signals to interfere with legitimate transmissions
[27]. The presence of wireless medium can easily expose objects to eavesdropping as
well.
In order to detect and mitigate various types of attacks in a network, extremely
lightweight but secure protocols need to be designed in view of the limited resources
of embedded sensor nodes. In today’s Internet, considerable efforts have been spent
on securing the existing standard authentication and authorization protocols such as
TLS [16] and Kerberos [28] among others. It indeed saves a lot of efforts if these
protocols are customized to be feasible for resource-constrained networks. However,
these protocols were not designed with the constrained networks in mind. Therefore,
profiling of an existing authentication protocol may not result in an optimal solution.
Another major concern is that the existing authentication protocols may not necessarily
comply with their original design objectives if they are used outside their intended
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domains of applications [29].
Almost all of the authentication and encryption schemes in the resource-constrained
IoT are based on DTLS protocol. The presence of computationally complex and
resource-consuming cipher suites in DTLS provides an expensive secured solution to
the objects of an IoT. As discussed in Section 2, most of the DTLS-based encryption
schemes emphasize on the use of DTLS without stateless cookies. With the absence of
stateless cookies, however, a server will be exposed to replay attacks [30].
In view of the above discussion, our goal is to develop a lightweight CoAP-based
authentication scheme for the objects in an IoT paradigm. An important question
which arises is “How lightweight does a protocol need to be?”A protocol is sufficiently
lightweight if there are ample resources available to other tasks after its deployment.
Therefore, the aim of our proposed scheme is to develop an authentication scheme
which meets the above requirements. Our proposed authentication scheme uses the
basic principles of the CoAP protocol for RESTful interactions. It is a lightweight mu-
tual authentication scheme for any client wishing to interact with a server to establish a
secure communication channel. Upon mutual authentication, the clients communicate
with the server for the resource observation. Only the authenticated clients are allowed
to observe the resources.
3.2. Payload-based Mutual Authentication
CoAP and our authentication scheme are not two separate protocols. For the au-
thentication, we have added security features into CoAP to make it more robust, ef-
ficient and secure against various malicious activities. Unlike the DTLS-enabled en-
cryption techniques, our proposed scheme provides authentication using the payload
of messages exchanged among the clients and the server. Both the client and the server
challenges each other during the authentication process. The complete process is per-
formed using four handshake messages where, the payload of each message is kept
a maximum of 256 bits as shown in Figure 3. The Advanced Encryption Standard
128-bit (AES-128) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [31] is used for the pay-
load encryption. The key size of 128-bit is sufficient for most of the objects in the IoT
paradigm due to the limited resources of the embedded sensor nodes. Our proposed
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scheme is completed using the following four steps:
1. Session/Connection initiation
2. Server challenge
3. Client response and challenge
4. Server response
Figure 3: Four-way Authentication Handshake
The session initiation is preceded by the provisioning phase. It is a prerequisite
offline phase during which the clients share a 128-bit AES pre-shared secret, λi, with
the server. The pre-shared secret is known only to the server and the client to whom
it belongs. The server maintains a table of such secrets, each one belonging to a par-
ticular client. Each object has a unique identifier (ID) associated with it which enables
the server to perform a table look-up for the identity verification. Upon successful ver-
ification, both parties communicate with each other for exchanging the session key. It
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is assumed that the end-devices are temper-safe to avoid compromising the security
primitives in accordance with the Internet Threat Model [32]. This model assumes that
pre-shared secrets are hardcoded with the embedded sensor nodes in each physical ob-
ject at the time of manufacturing and deployment. In case, if an attacker attempts to
temper with the hardware of a physical object, an alarm is generated to notify about the
security breach.
In the session initiation phase, each client sends a request message to the server sim-
ilar to a Hello Client message. It is a confirmable request for the creation of a session as
a resource at the server. The request is sent to the server URI, /.well-known/authorize.
Each message has a specific token for correlating the request with a matching response.
The object ID is transmitted in the message payload. Two options, Auth and Auth-Msg-
Type, are included in the request whose values indicate the type of operation performed
on a resource at the server. Upon successful verification of the client ID, the resource
authorize will be created at the server. The combination of Auth=true and Auth-Msg-
Type=0 indicates a session initiation request to the server.
During the server challenge phase, the server retrieves the object ID from the mes-
sage payload. Using this ID, the server performs a table look-up for a matching λi. If
a match is found, the server responds back with an encrypted payload using the AES
algorithm. As a new session is created for the client, a response code of 2.01 (Cre-
ated) is included in the message. If the server is unable to find a matching λi, it will
send a 4.01 (Unauthorized) response code. Moreover, the server needs to include the
same message ID and the token which are present in the session initiation request. It
can do so by simply copying them into the server challenge. This enables the client to
correlate a confirmable request with the corresponding response message.
To create the challenge, the server generates a pseudo-random nonce, ηserver, and
a potential session key, µkey , of 128 bits each. The nonce is a temporary number
which is used only once by an object in the entire cryptographic communication. At
this stage, an encrypted payload is generated by the server. First, an Exclusive OR
(XOR) operation is performed on λi and µkey using Equation 1. XOR operation is
computationally inexpensive and is extremely common as a component in complex
ciphers. Moreover, this operation does not leak information about the original plaintext
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and applying it twice enables the retrieval of original plaintext. In our case, plaintext is
the session key.
ψresultant = λi ⊕ µkey. (1)
The 128-bit resultant, ψresultant, is appended to ηserver and encrypted with λi to
generate a payload of 256-bit using Equation 2. This payload, γserver-payload, is trans-
mitted to the client as a challenge.
γserver-payload = AES{λi, (ψresultant|ηserver)}. (2)
In the client response and challenge phase, the client needs to decipher the en-
crypted payload, γserver-payload, to retrieve the potential session key, µkey . If the client is
successful to do so, it will have the correct ηserver and µkey . The ηserver and the µkey
are known only to the server and the λi belongs to a specific client. Only a legitimate
client can decipher this challenge. An intruder can only eavesdrop on the ηserver and
the µkey , but not the λi in accordance with the Internet Threat model. The client uses
its λi to decipher the payload. Upon successful deciphering, the client has authenti-
cated itself. As mutual authentication requires both parties to be verified, the server
also needs to authenticate itself. The client generates a new encrypted payload similar
to the server. First, an XOR is performed on ηserver and λi using Equation 3.
ψresultant = ηserver ⊕ λi. (3)
The 128-bit resultant, ψresultant, is appended with ηclient and encrypted with µkey
to generate an encrypted payload as shown in Equation 4. The 256-bit encrypted pay-
load, γclient-payload, is transmitted to the server as a challenge.
γclient-payload = AES{µkey, (ψresultant|ηclient)}. (4)
Finally, in the server response phase, the server deciphers the encrypted payload,
γclient-payload, of the client challenge to observe the ηserver in it. If present, the server
realizes that the client has successfully authenticated itself. The server retrieves the
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ηclient and creates an encrypted payload of its own by appending the ηclient to µkey
and encrypting with λi as shown in Equation 5. Next, the 256-bit encrypted payload,
γserver-payload, is transmitted in response to the client challenge.
γserver-payload = AES{λi, (ηclient|µkey)}. (5)
At this point of time, the status of the resource changes to Authenticated at the
server because the client is successfully authenticated and is eligible to observe the
resources. However, the client has yet to verify the authenticity of the server, so it
decrypts the payload, γserver-payload, and observe ηclient in it. As the client is the one
which generated the ηclient, the client comprehends that the response is from a legiti-
mate server. At this stage, both the client and the server are mutually authenticated and
they have agreed upon a common session key, µkey , for exchanging the data packets.
In our authentication scheme, the Auth and the Auth-Msg-Type options play an im-
portant role. Both of these options are critical and unsafe-to-forward. A critical or
elective option is related to the endpoint while the safe or unsafe-to-forward is used in
the proxy context. If an endpoint is unable to understand a request message having a
critical option, it must return a 4.02 Bad Option response to the sender. These options
do not have any default values unlike the core options such as Max-Age, Block, Uri-
Path and Uri-Authority [4]. Each of these options is to be assigned a number by the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)5. The Auth has a length of 0 byte be-
cause if the message header indicates that this option is present, it is true and thus there
is no need to occupy a byte. For the lightweight authentication schemes, it is important
to have a simple message format with extremely lightweight options and related fields.
The formats of these two options are shown in Table 1.
The presence of the Auth option indicates that the POST method carries an au-
thentication payload in the request message. The Auth-Msg-Type is always used in
combination with the Auth and its value indicates the type of authentication request by
the client. If its value is 0, it indicates a session initiation request and if its value is 1, it
5https://www.iana.org/
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No. C U N Name Format Length Default
TBD Yes Yes No Auth empty 0 (none)
TBD Yes Yes No Auth-Msg-Type uint 1 (none)
*C=Critical, *U= Unsafe-to-Forward, *N=NoCacheKey, *Length in Bytes
Table 1: Format of the Authentication Options
indicates a client response and challenge respectively. The four steps of our payload-
based mutual authentication along with the data exchange is shown in Algorithm 1.
4. Resilience of the Proposed Scheme Against Various Attacks
Our payload-based mutual authentication scheme is resilient to resource exhaus-
tion, DoS and replay attacks. Each client is restricted to establish a single connection
with a given server at a particular time which eliminates the possibility of resource
exhaustion. Resource exhaustion occurs when the resources necessary to perform an
action are entirely consumed, therefore preventing that action from taking place. A
client establishes more than one connection with a server to acquire multiple resources
which causes scarcity of such resources to other clients. Resource exhaustion results
in an unfair distribution of resources, ultimately leading to a DoS attack.
The client of a resource may be an intruder or a legitimate object. Each client
sends a session initiation request to the server in order to authenticate itself. The server
checks its table for a corresponding object ID to verify if the client has an ongoing
established session for data exchange after a successful authentication. If the given
client has an ongoing session with the server, the request for a new session is discarded.
Recall that the session initiation request is transmitted in a CON message for which an
ACK or an RST response is mandatory. After the transmission of a CON message,
the client triggers its timer and waits for a response within a × r seconds, where a
is the acknowledgement timeout and r is the acknowledgement random factor. The
acknowledgement timeout is the amount of time a client must wait for an ACK or an
RST response before a re-transmission attempt. Its default value is 2 seconds. The
acknowledgement random factor ensures that there is no clashing in the timeout values
used for subsequent transmissions. Its default value is 1.5 and it must always be greater
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Algorithm 1 Lightweight Payload-based Mutual Authentication
1: Initialization:
(a) Each Client Ci is provided with a unique Object_IDi and λi
(b) A server S is provided with all Object_IDi and λi stored in an arrayA[ ][ ]
2: Step 1: [Input: (Object_IDi, λi)] . Object_IDi, λi=2128, where i=1,2,3,...,N
3: for i = 1 : N do . Nested For loop generates a two-column server table
4: for j = 1 : 2 do
5: input (A[i][j]) . Object ID and λ of Ci are stored in the array
6: end for
7: end for
8: Step 2 [Session Initiation]: Ci sends a CON message containing Object_IDi in the payload to S
9: Step 3 [Server Challenge]: S retrieves Object_IDi to find a matching λi
10: if Object_IDi == A[i][j] then . Object ID of the client matches the Object ID in the server table
11: Session Created 2.01
12: Step 4: S responds with an encrypted payload, AES {λi, (λi ⊕ µkey|ηserver)}
13: . where µkey, ηserver = 2128 and message size=2256
14: else
15: Ci Unauthorized 4.01
16: end if
17: Step 5 [Client Response & Challenge]: Ci deciphers challenge and responds with an encrypted payload, AES
{µkey, (ηserver ⊕ λi|ηclient)},
18: Step 6 [Server Response]: S checks ηserver in the client challenge by comparing against the ηserver generated
in the server challenge
19: if Both matches then
20: [Access Granted]- Ci Authenticated
21: Step 7: S responds as AES {λi, (ηclient|µkey)} . message size=2256
22: else
23: [Access Denied]-Ci Unauthenticated
24: end if
25: Step 8: Ci compares ηclient of Step 5 and Step 6.
26: if Both matches then
27: S is authenticated
28: Step 9 [Data Exchange]: Mutual data exchange between S and Ci take place.
29: else
30: S is unauthenticated
31: end if
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than 1, i.e., 1 < r ≤ 1.5. A client can re-transmit a CON request up to 4 times after
the initial failed attempt provided it uses the same token and message ID.
If the client is an intruder, there will be a mismatch of IDs with the server, i.e.,
the object ID does not match with any of the object ID stored within the server table.
The server responds back with an RST message indicating an invalid object ID. At
this point, the server does not know if a client is an intruder or a legitimate one. An
intruder may re-transmit the same CON message up to 4 times provided it uses the same
object ID, message ID and token for each re-transmission attempt. After exhausting all
attempts, the client is declared as an intruder and any further attempts are considered
as attacks. The server refrains from any further communication with the given client,
i.e., the intruder. On the other hand, re-transmission with a different ID will generate
an RST response which is an indication that no further communication will take place
for establishing a session. An intruder may eavesdrop on the wireless link between a
legitimate client and the server, stole the object ID and use it for communication with
the server. There will be a match of IDs and the server will generate a challenge. As the
intruder does not have a valid λi, so it will not be able to decipher the challenge. In case
of a legitimate client, a match will always be found in the look-up table unless its object
ID is tempered. Even if the object ID is tempered by an error-prone communication link
or an intruder, the client has the option to re-transmit the CON message after waiting
for a×r seconds. A match with the server table is not a guarantee that a session will be
negotiated with a given client. If the IDs match, the server further evaluates the request
to verify if an ongoing established session exists with the given client. If a session is
found, the server responds back with an ACK message indicating that the client needs
to refrain from further re-transmissions.
The object ID of a client plays a crucial role in resource allocation and utiliza-
tion. In the server table, each ID is linked with a matching λi, the key required for
deciphering a challenge. The use of an invalid object ID generates an RST response
while eavesdropping results in an unsuccessful attempt of deciphering the server chal-
lenge. In both cases, the intruder fails to authenticate itself and is unable to observe
the resource, i.e., temperature readings, at the server. The procedure for detecting the
resource exhaustion attack is shown in Algorithm 2.
17
Algorithm 2 : Detection of Resource Exhaustion Algorithm
1: Initialization: A[ ][ ], Object_IDi, Re_Try
2: Step 1: [Input: (Object_IDi, λi)]
3: for i = 1 : N do




8: Step 2: Client Ci sends a session initiation request
9: Step 3: Server S retrieves Object ID from the session initiation request
10: for i : 1 : N do . Search through the server table
11: if Object_IDi == A[i][j] then . Object ID of the client matches the Object ID in the server table
12: Step 4: Check for an ongoing established session
13: if OnGoingSession == True then
14: Step 5: Discard Session Initiation Request
15: Step 6: Send ACK response to Ci . ACK informs Ci that this client is already observing resources
16: else
17: Generate a Server Challenge and send to Ci
18: if Ci decipher the challenge then
19: Ci is a legitimate client . S proceeds with establishing a session after successful authentication
20: else




25: if Object_IDi does not match A[i][j] then
26: Step 7: S responds back with an RST
27: Step 8: Ci does not proceed with any re-transmission attempts
28: else
29: Step 9: Ci re-transmits after waiting for a× r seconds
30: Re_Try++
31: end if
32: if Re_Try > 4 then
33: Ci is an intruder and is blacklisted
34: else




Apart from resource exhaustion and DoS attacks, our scheme is resilient to the
replay attack as well. In our authentication scheme, ηserver and ηclient are generated by
a pseudo-random number,Ri, which is appended to a timer, Ti. This combination ofRi
and Ti assures that an intruder will find it even more difficult to replay messages. Here,
Ti is used to guarantee that ηserver and ηclient are non-reproducible whileRi is used to
ensure that ηserver and ηclient are non-predictable. The non-reproducible nature of Ti
and the non-predictable features of Ri make it quite difficult for an intruder to launch a
replay attack. If in case, an intruder manages to capture µkey , it may communicate with
a given client by posing itself as the server of the network. The intruder may intercept
the data in-transit between the client and a server, uses the captured µkey and replay
the incoming data from the server to the client. Moreover, it may replay the captured
data to other clients in the network as well. This type of replay attack is short-lived and
last only for the duration of a particular session.
Upon successful mutual authentication, both the client and the server are authorized
to use µkey for exchanging the data packets. Each client sends a registration request to
the server for resource observation. The Registration Request Message (RRM) has an
observe option, which has a 24-bit sequentially incremental sequence number. When
the server realizes the presence of an observe option in an RRM, it registers the client
and notifies it upon each state change of a resource. The client may specify certain con-
ditions for the transmission of data from a server, also known as notification updates.
Upon transmission to a server, each client stores the transmitted RRM in its queue,
which has a unique token and a message ID for correlating the notification updates
from the server. The incoming notifications from the server will have an incremental
sequence number, a token and a message ID similar to an RRM. Potentially, a single
RRM can generate an enormous amount of notification updates. Once the conditions
specified by a client for notification updates are fulfilled at the server, data packets,
βdata, are transmitted to the given client as shown in Equation 6.
κclient-server = AES{µkey, βdata}. (6)
In Equation 6, βdata is encrypted with µkey . This encrypted data can only be
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deciphered by the client which possesses a valid λi and µkey .
In Figure 4, an intruder A eavesdrops on a full-duplex wireless link between the
server S and a client C1. It captures µkey , seizes the data packets and replay them to
C1, C2 and C4 along the way by posing to be a legitimate server. To detect a replay
attack, each client compares the message ID and token of an incoming notification
against the similar parameters of an RRM. If these parameters match, the client checks
the sequence number of the incoming notification. To do so, the client can make use
of a simple logic by comparing the incoming notification with the previously received
notification from a server as shown in Equation 7.
Ωfreshness = fresh when[(Vi < Vj) ∧ (Vj − Vi < 223)]∨
[(Vi > Vj) ∧ (Vi − Vj > 223)]. (7)
In Equation 7, we have used the freshness of the notification updates, Ωfreshness,
from a server as a measure to detect a replay attack. In this equation, Vj and Vi are
the 24-bit sequence numbers of an observe option in the incoming and the previously
received notifications. A notification is fresh and latest if Vj is greater than Vi and their
difference is less than 223. An incoming notification is also fresh if Vj is smaller than
Vi and their difference is greater than 223. The latter is the case when the value of Vj
rolls over [33].
In Figure 4, the intruder may or may not alter the sequence numbers of the incoming
notifications from a server. Irrespective of the alteration, the clients C2 and C4 can
easily detect a replay attack because these incoming notifications are intended for C1
only. There will be a mismatch between the token and message ID of an RRM and
those of the incoming notifications at C2 and C4 respectively. If the sequence numbers
of the notifications are altered, C1 can easily detect it by comparing the notifications
with the previous one. However, if the intruder replays the notifications without any
modification, it becomes a tricky situation as C1 is indeed waiting for such notifications
from the server. There will be a match of the tokens and message IDs between an RRM
and the incoming notifications. Moreover, the sequence numbers are also in the same
order as expected by this client. To solve this puzzle, C1 may use a time-stamp field in
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Figure 4: The Replay Attack in an IoT Environment
the RRM and the notification updates [34]. Alternatively, C1 may store in a queue the
notifications previously received from a server within the acknowledgement timeout.
As the incoming notifications at C1 are replayed by an intruder, their timeout values
play a crucial role. At this point of time, C1 does not know whether the incoming
notifications are replayed or not. Therefore, it checks the sequence number of these
notifications against the previously received notifications in a sequential order. For
example, the incoming notification, Vn, is checked against Vn−1 to determine if it was
received within the acknowledgement timeout after the successful reception of Vn−1.
The entire mechanism of replay attack detection is shown in the flowchart of Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Flowchart for the Replay Attack Detection
exchange of data between a legitimate client and a server. Replay attack is not possible
at the time of establishing a session, i.e., mutual authentication, because each client has
its own λi known only to the given client and the server. An intruder may capture the
server challenge payload and retrieve ηserver and µkey from it. However, it still require
λi for encrypting the payload. The lack of an authentic λi will generate a suspicious
payload which will be identified easily by the clients.
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5. Experimental Results
In this section, we provide the experimental results for our proposed scheme. We
used NetDuino Plus 2 boards for the client and server interaction model. We performed
our experimental work using .NET Micro Framework, a .NET Framework platform for
resource-constrained devices with at least 256 KB of flash and 64 KB of RAM. The
NetDuino server uses a DS18B20 temperature sensor to obtain the temperature read-
ings. Upon successful authentication, the clients are allowed to observe the temperature
resource. We use the CoAPSharp6 library which provides a very basic communication
model for resource exchanges. For the authentication provisioning, we have created
our own library, CoAPMicro, which runs on top of the CoAPSharp and uses its com-
munication model for security provisioning. Our library is efficient and robust, and
consumes relatively less amount of resources. To justify our claim, a detailed compar-
ison against various existing schemes is presented here.
5.1. Authentication
Each client needs to authenticate itself for observation of the resources. In Figure
6(a), the successful handshake between a client and the server is shown. The Auth and
the Auth-Msg-Type are the extended options used only for our authentication purpose.
They are yet to be assigned numbers by IANA, so they appear as unrecognized. We use
temporary numbers 0x101(257) and 0x102(258) for these options in our library using
the option registry mechanism. The client and the server have successfully agreed upon
a common session key and the handshake duration along with the round-trip response
time is obtained. In Figure 6(b), the client is unable to decipher the server challenge
as it does not possess the required secret, λi. The outcome is an incorrect session
key which causes the denial of access to the resource. In both cases, the presence or
absence of the pre-shared secret determines the outcome of the authentication.
5.2. Handshake Duration
The handshake duration is computed as the sum of time taken by two round-trip







Exchange routine started on thread 0x03. 
-SERVER- Key: 4F9DB1949D924031-8C77BE06276ECB25 Nonce1:  
 26C1B93F46C133A7-376D867B0F990023 Nonce2:  
Exchange routine started on thread 0x04. 
#1 [0xCA337F4A6DDBB66C] ACK 4.01 (Unauthorized) 
-CLIENT- Sending AUTH greeting message to server. 
[WARNING] Unrecognized option 0x101. Defaulted to opaque format. 
[WARNING] Unrecognized option 0x102. Defaulted to opaque format. 
-CLIENT- Server challenge: #2 [0x44A2B63A183163C6]  
 ACK 2.01 (Created), 1196 ms 
-CLIENT- Key: 5CDA810C12EE36AE-16C3D4FA0EA79FDF  
 Nonce1: 26C1B93F46C133A7-376D867B0F990023  
 Nonce2: 7562DB9C6D7DED45-5D767BD30B3EA320 
-CLIENT- Replying to server challenge... 
-CLIENT- Final reply from server: #3 [0xF845FAFB4C983061] 
 ACK 2.04 (Changed), 96 ms 
-CLIENT- Total handshake duration: 2559 ms 
-CLIENT- Mutual trust acquired.  
 Authentication handshake completed. 






















(a) Resource Access Granted
  
 
The thread '<No Name>' (0x2) has exited with code 0 (0x0). 
[CLIENT] Started. 
The thread '<No Name>' (0x2) has exited with code 0 (0x0). 
[SERVER] Started. 
[SERVER] Key: 4F9DB1949D924031-8C77BE06276ECB25 
Nonce1: 4BAFCDE9430E5773-24E5095A6614BF17 
Nonce2: 
[CLIENT] Key: 6619DB083FA7049A-70F225566ED3847A 
Nonce1: 4BAFCDE9430E5773-24E5095A6614BF17 
Nonce2: 6DFB243F1F64BE50-142C6CFE3382DAAF 
[CLIENT] Replying to server challenge... 
[CLIENT] Resource access denied. 
(b) Resource Access Denied
Figure 6: The Authentication Process
client’s session initiation request is acknowledged through a server challenge whereas
the client response & challenge is acknowledged through a server response. The hand-
shake duration, dhandshake, is computed at the client-end using Equation 8.
dhandshake = Tsession + Tchallenge + δproc. (8)
In this equation, Tsession is the round-trip time taken by session initiation request,
Tchallenge is the round-trip taken by client response & challenge and the δproc is the
processing time taken by the client. The processing time at the server is part of the two
round-trip messages.
To compute the handshake duration, we perform 20 random handshakes between
the clients and the server. To determine the variability and accuracy among the read-






(xi − µ)2. (9)
Here, σ is the standard deviation, N is the total number of readings, µ is the mean
value and xi is the actual handshake duration of each individual reading.
In Figure 7, we have compared our scheme with the CoAP-based DTLS implemen-
tation (INDIGO) for smartphones. DTLS∗ represents the handshake between a smart-
phone and a standard computer. In this case, the smartphone acts as a client whereas
the standard computer acts as a server. DTLS+ represents the smartphone as a server
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and the computer as a client. Both these implementations use DTLS on the client and
the server. The creation of stateless cookie at the server and the exchange of compu-
tationally complex certificates and raw-public keys contribute to a higher handshake
duration for DTLS∗ and DTLS+ respectively. Moreover, the simultaneous execution
of multiple processes inside an android device contributes to a much higher standard






























Handshake Duration Standard Deviation
Figure 7: The Handshake Duration
5.3. Average Response Time
In our scheme, the CoAP messages are exchanged asynchronously over the UDP
sockets. Each client maintains the record of the transmitted CON request messages
to keep track of their transit through the network. When a matching ACK or an RST
response is received for such messages, the exchange is considered as successful.
In Figure 8(a), the average response time for each message is computed for a server
handling multiple requests at a given time. The response time increases with the in-
crease of simultaneously transmitted messages. When the number of such requests,
n, is 100, the response time is significantly higher which can ultimately cause conges-
tion, scarcity of resources and denial of services to the clients in the network. The
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response time is considerably lower for 20 and 50 of multiple requests of such type
and the payload size has little impact on the average response time for these values
of n. In Figure 8(b), the average response time for a single confirmable message of
1 byte is compared with those of the DTLS and the CoAP protocol with no security.
As explained previously, the presence of certificates, raw-public keys and expensive

























































(b) Response Time at 1 Byte Payload
Figure 8: The Average Response Time
5.4. Average Memory Consumption
The average memory consumption of a message at the compile time is obtained by
using the Debug.GC() method of the Microsoft.SPOT.Native assembly. In Figure 9(a),
the average memory consumption is computed for varying payload sizes. The number
of request messages has a significant impact on the memory consumption whereas the
payload of each message has a minor impact. This is due to the fact that the server
allocates memory on per message basis rather than per byte basis.
In Figure 9(b), we compare our scheme with the existing schemes for a confirmable
message of 500 bytes. CoapBlip [35] and its variant TinyCoAP [36] allocate a substan-
tial amount of memory to the messages at the compile time. CoapBlip is an adaptation
of the standard C libraries which require TinyOS component for its installation on a
sensor node. The use of C libraries is too complex for the resource constrained sensors
embedded in a physical object. On the other hand, HTTP/UDP has a low memory foot-










































































(b) Consumption at 500 Byte Payload
Figure 9: The Average Memory Consumption
scheme ensures that sufficient memory is available to other tasks at the compile time.
The allocated memory is immediately released upon a successful message exchange.
5.5. Detection of Replay Attacks
As an application layer protocol, CoAP is exposed to various denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. Even in the presence of an authentication scheme, intruders always
try to sneak into a network to conduct malicious activities. The number of such ac-
tivities increases with the increase in the number of intruders in the network. In Table
2, the number of replay attacks at the time of session initiation and data exchange is
computed over a period of 60 seconds.
Time (sec) Intruder A∗ Intruder B∗ Intruder A+ Intruder B+
0-10 3 5 8 2
11-20 6 2 4 4
21-30 3 4 11 7
31-40 4 0 4 3
41-50 1 2 8 3
51-60 7 6 0 2
Table 2: Number of Detected Replay Attacks
Here, A∗ and B∗ represent the number of replay attacks launched by intruders A
and B during session initiation request, i.e., during mutual authentication phase. The
number of replay attacks during data exchange is represented by A+ and B+. In Table
2, the number of replay attacks during data exchange is launched on packet flows,
where each flow may contain several packets. For example, during the first 10 seconds,




In this paper, we have proposed a payload-based authentication scheme to verify
the identities of the communicating clients and server in the network. It uses a simple
handshake procedure to exchange the session key for the resource observation. The
proposed scheme uses pre-shared secrets for the identity verification of objects. These
secrets are known only to the legitimate clients and server and they cannot be obtained
illicitly in view of the Internet Threat Model. Our experimental results show significant
improvement over the existing schemes for the resource-constrained objects. Our pro-
posed scheme is efficient against eavesdropping, DoS, replay and resource exhaustion
attacks. However, it is yet to be determined how efficient and robust the scheme is
against other types of attacks. Furthermore, the proposed scheme allocates pre-shared
keys at the provisioning phase, so it is a ideal choice for static deployment. If the
pre-shared key of an incoming mobile client is not present in the server lookup table,
the client will not be able to communicate with the server. For this type of scenario, a
dynamic key allocation is an optimal choice. This is specifically the case with a large
scale IoT environment. The scalability and mobility may further improve the proposed
scheme and broaden its scope. The resource-constrained nature of the sensor nodes
will be a challenging task in provisioning of the above facilities for such a lightweight
authentication scheme.
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